tech/a
No Ordinary Duck
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I'm on the search for any papers relative to any analysis F/A or T/A that has been rigorously tested
The result positive or negative is un important. The veracity of the testing is however---must be Evidence based.
If you know of any could you post up a link.
Have a bit from Dr Bruce Vanstone and a few others.
Howard Bandy??
Deep State??
Craft??
Sinner??
Anyone else interested in this stuff?
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/results.cfm?RequestTimeout=50000000
Just use the search facility and knock yourself out.
Following the references in papers of interest becomes a great source for finding further papers.
We study the returns to value and momentum strategies jointly across eight diverse markets and asset classes. Finding consistent value and momentum premia in every asset class, we further find strong common factor structure among their returns. Value and momentum are more positively correlated across asset classes than passive exposures to the asset classes themselves. However, value and momentum are negatively correlated both within and across asset classes. Our results indicate the presence of common global risks that we characterize with a three factor model. Global funding liquidity risk is a partial source of these patterns, which are identifiable only when examining value and momentum simultaneously across markets. Our findings present a challenge to existing behavioral, institutional, and rational asset pricing theories that largely focus on U.S. equities.
We update our annual analysis of expected returns for 38 equity markets around the world. Based on current CAPE valuations, we expect mid to high single-digit yearly returns in most developed equity markets. However, risks are elevated for some markets. We specifically investigate drawdown risk and find that given its current valuation levels, the US market in particular exhibits a high risk of significant future drawdowns.
We provide a tractable model of firm-level expected holding period returns using two firm fundamentals ― book-to-market ratio and ROE ― and study the cross-sectional properties of the model-implied expected returns. We find that: 1) firm level expected returns and expected profitability are time-varying, but highly persistent; 2) forecasts of holding period returns strongly predict the cross section of future returns up to three years ahead. We document a highly significant predictive pooled regression slope for future quarterly returns of 0.86, whereas the popular factor-based expected return models have either an insignificant or a significantly negative association with future returns. In supplemental analyses, we show that these forecasts are also informative of the time-series variation in aggregate conditions: 1) for a representative firm, the slope of the conditional expected return curve is more positive in good times, when expected short-run returns are relatively low; 2) the model-implied forecaster of aggregate returns exhibits modest predictive ability. Collectively, we provide a simple, theoretically-motivated, and practically useful approach to estimating multi-period ahead expected returns.
High dividend yield stocks do not reliably earn above-average risk-adjusted returns. More complete measures of shareholder yield, which account for net share repurchases, perform better. We explore the use of net-debt paydown as a way to further enhance shareholder yield. The addition of net-debt paydown enhances risk-adjusted returns and creates a shareholder yield metric that is more robust over time. We also explore the technique of separating yield metrics by payout percentage as a way to enhance return predictability. We find some evidence that using payout percentage within a yield category can systematically improve portfolio performance.
Mean-Variance Optimization (MVO) as introduced by Markowitz (1952) is often presented as an elegant but impractical theory. MVO is "an unstable and error-maximizing" procedure (Michaud 1989), and "is nearly always beaten by simple 1/N portfolios" (DeMiguel, 2007). And to quote Ang (2014): "Mean-variance weights perform horribly… The optimal mean-variance portfolio is a complex function of estimated means, volatilities, and correlations of asset returns. There are many parameters to estimate. Optimized mean-variance portfolios can blow up when there are tiny errors in any of these inputs...".
In our opinion, MVO is a great concept, but previous studies were doomed to fail because they allowed for short-sales, and applied poorly specified estimation horizons. For example, Ang used a 60 month formation period for estimation of means and variances, while Asness (2012) clearly demonstrated that prices mean-revert at this time scale, where the best assets in the past often become the worst assets in the future.
In this paper we apply short lookback periods (maximum of 12 months) to estimate MVO parameters in order to best harvest the momentum factor. In addition, we will introduce common-sense constraints, such as long-only portfolio weights, to stabilize the optimization. We also introduce a public implementation of Markowitz's Critical Line Algorithm (CLA) programmed in R to handle the case when the number of assets is much larger than the number of lookback periods.
We call our momentum-based, long-only MVO model Classical Asset Allocation (CAA) and compare its performance against the simple 1/N equal weighted portfolio using various global multi-asset universes over a century of data (Jan 1915-Dec 2014). At the risk of spoiling the ending, we demonstrate that CAA always beats the simple 1/N model by a wide margin.
This webinar is kind of along those lines tech, he goes on and shows that there is apparently no edge in fibs, S/R etc. and show's what there apparently is an edge in....plus other stuff. Might be of interest(if you can watch through an hour and 50min).
Also goes on about randomness and how the markets are mostly noise and that even though we may know of some successful traders that could still be random/chance. Interesting thoughts....
Do we really need proof that buying $1 for 50 cents is profitable?
The only difficulties is making sure it's actually $1. How do you make sure of that? Look carefully at the business.
But then some would look at the business and say, it's not worth $1 now but it will be $1 in the future... So that's where all the fun comes in.
Do we really need proof that buying $1 for 50 cents is profitable?
The only difficulties is making sure it's actually $1. How do you make sure of that? Look carefully at the business.
But then some would look at the business and say, it's not worth $1 now but it will be $1 in the future... So that's where all the fun comes in.
So If I'm going to be in that 10% or have ambitions of being there
Id want Evidence---not just a belief that has been touted around for years---works.
You'll only find evidence of regularities - not immutable laws. Unless you can predict the future you will not know how long the regulatory will be stationary. Some results with the appearance of regularities just result from the data mining process and are unlikely to persist beyond random others may have a cause but every man and his hedge fund is in a race to harvest the causal regularities which will inevitably arb them away. The hardest to harvest or most obscure will likely persist the longest.
I suspect what defines your 10% is they "know" they are dealing with uncertainty and lack of evidence and come up with solutions to still cope. Continual checking of their beliefs against reality and adaption when reality dictates it necessary.
The best that evidence based approach can achieve is a regularity that has cause rather than arising from randomness. But because the regulatory may not be stationary in the future as people try to harvest it you still have to manage uncertainty.
Yes I think we do.
in fact many many accepted and adopted trading and investing ideas and methods are used by just about everyone WITHOUT any evidence based validation.
Just taking 2 widely accepted ideas.
Buying Value
Buying increasing Volume
You me and 10000 others will trade the exact same signals multiple ways and offering just as many
differing reasons for any failures.
But where is the evidence that you/me or the other 10000 of us have a snowballs chance in hell to return a consistent profit.
90% according the evidence I have on trader success-----fail---longer term.
So those who adopt the two ideas above would be in that lot.
I presume---(although I don't have the evidence) that some of the 10% also reside there.
So If I'm going to be in that 10% or have ambitions of being there
Id want Evidence---not just a belief that has been touted around for years---works.
...
Evidence suggests that over the short term, price is difficult to predict and governed much more by investor risk preferences. However over the long term, investment securities can be expected to return a value approximate to their long term stream of cash flows (which can be forecast). So both matter.
...
Not really.
While it's true that the market price cannot be predicted in the short term, it also follow that the price cannot be predicted in the long term too. Just logic.
It's wrong to say that over the long term, the value will be corrected. That's nonsense.
Over the long term, perhaps the market may come to agree with your assessment and upgrade or "correct" their pricing much more aligned to the fundamentals of the company - reflecting its true value in the long run.
But that is very different from saying that over the long term, we'll be right, or the market will be right. It may, it may not.
---
That is, when you estimate the approximate value of the company, your estimate is not that the price will be X in two years' time or 5 years' time etc. Your estimate is that its value is X to Y right now... and in time, the market will see that - you hope.
When the market sees and agrees with you, say in 2 years time... the value of the company maybe have changed, may stay the same, or may have deteriorated. At that point, you must look to determine which condition it is in.
Example. Say I value company A at $10. It is now selling at $5. So I buy it for $5.
In two years' time the price went to $10. It does not automatically follow that $10 is fair value, or that my value has fully realised. The company may have won a few big contracts, may be become more efficient, new markets or sanctions have been lifted and it's expanding... So no, $10 is not fair value.
The reserve could happen. That condition is terrible and it's about to be known by everyone. So $10 is really pushing it. etc. etc.
To think that in the long term the value will be realised tend to lead to buying now for unknown future possibilities.
Example. Say I value company A at $10. It is now selling at $5. So I buy it for $5.
In two years' time the price went to $10. It does not automatically follow that $10 is fair value, or that my value has fully realised. The company may have won a few big contracts, may be become more efficient, new markets or sanctions have been lifted and it's expanding... So no, $10 is not fair value.
The reserve could happen. That condition is terrible and it's about to be known by everyone. So $10 is really pushing it. etc. etc.
Completely regardless of what price you value some security at, the long term (hint, long term means a lot longer than 2 years) returns on any given security will be approximately equal to the stream of cash flows associated with that security.
Just logic.
The way you misinterpreted my statement and got into an argument with yourself about the misinterpretation is very cute.
As sinner says, 2 years is not a realistic time scale, none the less you seem oblivious to the obvious point that the very events you postulate impacting upon the price do so because in the long term they will change the free cash flow to the business, which as we know is what detirmines a companies value in the long term!
Obviously value is dynamic and its necessary to revist valuations and check for potential impacts both positively and negatively on free cash flow.
I also personally think of value as range rather than a point, I am not sure how anyone believes its possible to calculate value of a company to a specific point, given the variability of a number of the assumptions required.
So you spend countless hours predicting cash rates and all that to come to a range of value. Then if it turn out right or wrong or really wrong or really right... how do you know what causes it to be right or wrong? You got like half a dozen variables that could have cause it - and that's just on your modelling alone.
The earnings might be up, why? Interest rates? maybe. Greek crisis? No? New competitor? All of them? To what degree?
So DCF asks you to be precise, but then you can't be. But let's do it anyway.
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