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- ditto - when RM says with strong conviction that P/E is not appropriate to value a company when in fact his "ROE/RoR x Equity per share" is of course P/E restated - do the math. That he gets away with this beats me.
To be fair to Roger, he did actually sell out of TRS near the top of its most recent high (ie., before its price was crunched after the Brisbane floods).
Also to be fair to him, he does devote a chapter in his book to selling a company holding. He isn't strictly a "buy and hold" type of guy, it's just that many people construe his strategy as a "buy and hold".
The ironic thing about Value.Able is that, at its heart is an exhortation to those reading it to think about their investments for themselves and to not be a sheep. However, through his constant self-promotion through various media outlets, Roger has gathered together a flock of sheep who do nothing except what he does, except at a time really of Roger's choosing.
I was quite annoyed when I read that Roger had purchased into a gold stock but wouldn't disclose the name until much later (ie., when Roger needed a rally to increase the value of his holding). That followed on the heels of Roger announcing that he had bought into a telco that appeared to violate his much-trumpeted rules.
Roger's actions in the past six months have left me feeling very cynical about him and his system he's peddling.
The nonsense of coming up with a standalone valuation based on ROE is that ROE is based on the Book Value. A stock might look like a really good buy on that basis. But you can't buy it for the Book Value - it's not available at that price. It's only available at "BV * P/B" (a metric known by the more common term "price"). So you're left with the question of how much over BV you're prepared to pay ... what your acceptable P/B is before you decide you're paying too much over the odds. Or take the reciprocal and it's ROR.
P/B and ROR are the same thing.
Ultimately, it comes down to a "buy/don't buy" decision, and since you can only buy at the price, it's self-evident that price becomes a factor.
When Roger says you shouldn't use price in producing a valuation, all he does is defer the introduction of price to the next step in the process. He's not removing it from the formula -- he's just changing where the brackets go.
There are too many inconsistencies and black holes to RM for my liking.
- ditto - when RM says with strong conviction that P/E is not appropriate to value a company when in fact his "ROE/RoR x Equity per share" is of course P/E restated - do the math. That he gets away with this beats me.
- ditto - re. his "formula" giving added valuation weight (to power of 1.8) where ROE is greater than RoR - by definition means that sustainable earnings growth for companies with high ROE must be higher than companies with lower ROE. This is a bold and bogus assumption (as of course is not always true) and takes the important analysis out of people's hands. A company like JB-Hi-Fi had an IV of $30 about now per RM about 18 months ago because it is not a capital intensive business and had high ROE. This has nothing to do with sustainability of earnings.
- ditto - his assumption of linking a company's sustainable earnings growth to its div. payout ratio.
Rather than bogus methods for estimating, let's get directly of what we are trying to measure. i.e. sustainable earnings and sustainable earnings growth. The derive this from ROE>RoR and div. payout is frankly bogus - and to derive this without enlightening the audience (who might be investing real money) of the limitations and risks in this very basic approach (in the interests of selling a book) is a charlatan.
- ditto - is RM's lack of depth in his book (because a difficult topic) of selecting an appropriate RoR for a company - and in not conveying to the audience the high risk in the RoR number itself and the consequences of getting this wrong (sensitivity of values derived) - which is easy to get wrong for all but the bluest of blue chips. For an "A1" to be an "A1" it should have strong prospect of remaining an "A1" for the next 10 years. Otherwise its not an A1. RoR can vary substantially from company to company based on its risk profile and only professionals and those with an in depth knowledge of the business can really assess this. The reason perhaps that Buffet's RoR's are reportedly constant at around 10% is perhaps because there is equally little risk in the companies in his selection portfolio. i.e. he has already picked companies he can understand (he admits to not understanding and not being interested in most) with a long proven record, large moats and excellent management.
waimate01, you lost me there. ROE as used by Roger has nothing to do with using book values
Mike, am I right in assuming from the above that you are interpreting RR in the formula as 'Rate of Return'? It's not, it's 'Required Return' - the minimum return you'd be happy to accept for your investment. It has nothing to do with the P/E ratio. It shouldn't vary from company to company or from alternative investment to alternative investment.
If I have understood what I have read correctly, the Letter gives you a quality rating and the number a liquidity event risk rating. An A1 is a high quality company (ie in the long run the group of A companies should, providing they stay solvent, produce better results than the B's and C's) with a very low (but not zero) risk of a 'liquidity event' occurring.
MCE is an A2 (was A1) despite the lumpy cashflow because it supposedly has good management, technology, facilities, market share etc and because it has about two years worth of cash.
ROE = EPS / BV
This metric "ROE/RoR to power of 1.8" removes necessary judgement to value a business (sustainability of earnings and earnings growth), has a bias to penalise some valuations unfairly (capital intensive businesses) and has a bias to reward unfairly (false positives) companies with high ROE.
Hi all,
How people can blindly follow the advice of RM aka “Mr. -95%”is beyond me (read CCP tread for an understanding of his ‘nickname’).
To consider an investor successful, he/she needs to have a solid record built up during years, bear/bull markets in and out. (Peter Lynch, WB). Seriously, even the title of this tread is wrong, how come we can even compare Buffet’s method with the one of RM?
RM advocates buying into super-cyclical companies, (MCE, FGE) and on top of that, uses a “one size fits all” valuation metric.
Come on! Nick Scali an A1/A2? That piece of garbage! And how come BHP, the best ever company Australia has ever seen is not one?
His method needs to be amended if not scrapped altogether to take into consideration:
• The fact that some companies are cyclical
• The fact that some extraordinary companies are capital intensive
Never have been a believer myself, and never will be, I will buy the index any day than following RM advice.
Regards,
I have read RM's book. I'd point you to Page 191 which says:
"... you need to apply a discount rate (this is what I have referred to as the 'investor's required return')".
Whilst RM walks a fine line in not opening himself to critique here, my note in the margin of his book was that "this will mislead the novice."
On page 192, Roger gives one paragraph to what is perhaps the most important aspect in valuing a company. He says "Finally, the investor's required return should take into account a compensation for risk - what is known as the 'equity risk premium'. If this additional rate is ,say, 4 per cent, then the investors required return is: ...." (emphasis added)
This is a very big "say"!!
The risk premium attributable to a particular company takes into account market risk being your preparedness to expose yourself to the market incl. the company's volatility in the market (beta) + sector risk + company specific risk.
Company specific risk is the risk attached to sustainability of earnings + sustainability of earnings growth (if you have allowed for this). To keep this premium low (as Buffet does by the way he selects potential investments) requires you to (1) fully understand the business; (2) have a business which has a sustainable competitive advantage relative to its peers; and (3) have management with integrity + excellent business development skills.
Versus the above-mentioned single para by Roger, there are a number of books devoted entirely to this subject to equity risk premium assessment - but not very sexy.
On the plus side at least RM is out in the public domain lifting the profile of value investing and exposing many others in the business who are complete charlatans and con men.
Using RM as your starting point if you are a new investor is not such a bad thing. The next step is to start reading more literature on valuing investing and getting to the bits that RM glosses over and get a more rounded knowledge of value investing techniques
They usually talk about adding on a factor for inflation and your personal tax rate (eg in Graham's 'The Intelligent Investor'. Buffett and Clark in 'Buffetology' say that since in the US there have been lengthy periods of double digit inflation and tax rates over 50%, Warren Buffett usually simplifies it to requiring 15% (others claim 9% or 10%), but the main thing is - since we're trying to buy at less than IV, not at IV, it doesn't have to be perfect, we can make up for it by a separate substantial Margin of Safety.
waimate01, I will reply with an example perhaps but no time right now.
This metric "ROE/RoR to power of 1.8" removes necessary judgement to value a business (sustainability of earnings and earnings growth), has a bias to penalise some valuations unfairly (capital intensive businesses) and has a bias to reward unfairly (false positives) companies with high ROE.
waimate01, I will reply with an example perhaps but no time right now.
This metric "ROE/RoR to power of 1.8" removes necessary judgement to value a business (sustainability of earnings and earnings growth), has a bias to penalise some valuations unfairly (capital intensive businesses) and has a bias to reward unfairly (false positives) companies with high ROE.
The margin of safety is used to take into account of the future variables - revenue, costs and cash flow etc. You can't double use it to compensate for a smaller discount rate.
Using a 9-10% discount will have you valuing something far higher than everyone else in the market, which means you will never have the opportunity to realise the gains.
Historical market risk premium for the Australian market is 6-7% (from memory of finance lectures) so the minimum anyone should use in the current environment is 12-13%. Err on the side of conservatism, 15% is a nice round number.
I am interpreting as a general factor allowing for equities being riskier than T bonds or similar things ....
you've missed out Roger's very specific comments about CAPM and how he doesn't think it is appropriate to include 'beta' and why (pp191-2).....
.. but they mostly are derived from entirely different valuation models, so (arguably, obviously) are not appropriate here.
Warren Buffett usually simplifies it to requiring 15% (others claim 9% or 10%) ...
... but the main thing is - since we're trying to buy at less than IV, not at IV, it doesn't have to be perfect, we can make up for it by a separate substantial Margin of Safety.
... And to be fair to Rm, the IV chapter is 39 pages out of 251, less than 16%; so it's a pity that people don't take as much notice of the other 84% where he does look at a lot of the other things which should be considered.
I entirely agree 9 or 10%, like I keep seeing people use, is just silly. I use 15%, but that's me, it's not necessarily 'right'
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