Hi,
No right or wrong answers since what is defined as "value" is rather vague, but it would be interesting to hear everyone's ideas.
Some people have rather definitive definitions of value, so right and wrong ideas you will get.
As for MND, looked at this last week and immediately saw that i should of been looking at it 9 months ago when it was better value...timing oh so important.
Hi, I'm assuming you're also a value investor?
Do you have any thoughts about Flight Centre? I bought this one last week
This forum is awfully quite, are there no value investors here?
What defines value?
If it's cheapness based on future discretionary cash flow basis then "profitably" becomes a very important factor. In your MND case you, you give your assumption of growth and cost of capital but without a future profitability assumption you are failing to disclose a vital ingredient in the valuation calculation. (disclosure: I hold MND, so I don't disagree with your overall conclusion)
My latest research candidate is PAC = "superficially" it looks cheap, if you want to dig into it we could possibly discuss. (disclosure - I only hold a feel it out quantity to date.) Its messy and has recent bad performance - but therein may lay the opportunity. Stress its just the current research topic.
No
Looking at the chart it was 10/12% cheaper 1/2 months ago...better Value.
Quiet on the weekends, a few value people here.
Hi Craft,
Thank you for your reply! By a "value", my definition is that basically assessing what you personally think something is worth, and if there is a difference to what the market is pricing it at, then play on that difference. The bigger the difference, the bigger the margin of safety. Contrarian technical analysts are also somewhat value investors in my opinion (like So_Cynical above), since they identify something that is temporarily oversold or overbought and play on that difference, except they only use price. The only people who are not value investors imo are those why buy simply because the price has gone up, nothing wrong with this if you manage your risk well, although I think very few people can do this consistently over the long-term.
Regarding MND, estimating future profitability is extremely difficult, even management gets it wrong. Forgot where I read it, but basically it is better to get roughly right than precisely wrong. I use that approach to earnings estimation. As mentioned, I do think FY2017 contract sales will be greater than FY2016 (MND won $1.1b in NEW contracts in FY2016, compare this to FY2015 when they won only $450m in NEW contract which directly impacted FY2016 sales). However their margins are decreasing, which is expected in an industry downtown, the question I guess is how their margin comparing to competitors, this I haven't compared, do you know their main competitors? Do you have any thoughts are estimating profitability?
I like this sort of reverse engineering thinking however 3% growth at profitability levels above the cost of capital gives a very different valuation to growth profitability at or below cost of funds. (well at least It should)Hi,
The market is pricing this stock at about 3% perpetual growth at 10% cost of capital, I think they have more potential than this.
Hi Craft,
Interesting you mentioned PAC, I had a look at this one last week, at first glance the historical price action caught my eye, appears to be out of favour stock, however the price hasn't stabilised yet and continue reaching new low as of last week. From experience I think it is better to wait until the price has shown some support, i.e. trending sideways, otherwise you might catch a falling dagger.
They have no debt on the balance sheet, BUT, they have $235m in operating lease. Operating lease is essentially a form of debt, and with only $3m in cash, they're massively over-leveraged. In fact, it occupies second bottom on my list due capital structure, only above SGH (SGH in my opinion is just a ticking time bomb). Basically I won't touch this one with ten foot pole. I would love to hear your opinion? Happy to discuss any others you think are interesting, it seems we're hunting for similar stocks.
Hi Craft,
They have no debt on the balance sheet, BUT, they have $235m in operating lease. Operating lease is essentially a form of debt, and with only $3m in cash, they're massively over-leveraged.
Bugger. I just spent an hour typing up a post. Got distracted by something and had to walk away. Come back and hit preview to proof read and lost it. Thought I'd hit copy/paste, but obviously hadn't.The balance sheet looks fine to me at the moment but they could soon stuff that up with acquisitions.
Bugger. I just spent an hour typing up a post. Got distracted by something and had to walk away. Come back and hit preview to proof read and lost it. Thought I'd hit copy/paste, but obviously hadn't.
Crux of the post was that PAC's balance sheet is OK, but they are constrained with what they can and cannot do by the Aurora Trust. There's a knock-on effect. It also stops them from doing the sensible thing and buying back shares if management truly think they are super cheap.
Aurora's balance sheet itself, for a Fund manager, looks really stretched. Current liability deficit of $16m above cash. How do they Fund this? Needs a bit of faith in 2017FY cash flow. If not, borrow again and hope it comes good?
Also the reason why they needed to defer the $42m XRPU redemption it appears. I assume that this goes to the unit holders (ie. 65% to PAC). But where is it in PAC's accounts? Is it buried in the JV line item, I can't see it there. Are they not allowed to include it under the accounting standards because it's too contingent at this stage?
Otherwise, agree it's a tangled mess of entities and opaque reporting. Yes, that can provide opportunity, but it also adds extra layers of risk, because it's very hard to get the necessary information to dig down into the Aurora Trust numbers. Management don't seem to care on this score. Red flag.
History of value destruction through corporate activity. Also very hard to work out the money trail as part of the merger in 2014 that created the trust. Second hand info (can't confirm because earnings call not released) but seems like they are still looking to buy more stuff.
Watch out for share holder dilution in terms of employee share schemes within the entities fully or partially owned by the Aurora Trust. See Celeste as an example. Ripped up about 10% of the equity in one hit to incentivise employees.
Can't see a competitive advantage, in fact, where they are based in the US it's possible they are seen as "old world" and the new kids on the block (ie. Robo advice, ETFs) are disrupting the industry because their fee models are cheaper and more transparent. Not sure of the end game there, but definitely need to keep an eye on it.
Other thing to ponder, are the investment impairments / write-downs, really one-off expenses for entities that are serial acquirers of assets? Hmmm.
They only have to repeat the RARE experience (purchased by Legg Mason!) with a minority of the funds they are invested in to provide significant value creation (if they don't simultaneously destroy wealth.)
I don't necessarily disagree with that, but the problem lies in sitting back waiting for that to happen (if it even does), with all the other risks sitting in the forefront of the mind.Good insights - I share probably all the sentiments you expressed here - but still I'm not sure that there is not real opportunity here. I have regard for Investor Mutual the only fund I really know much about in the stable.
They only have to repeat the RARE experience (purchased by Legg Mason!) with a minority of the funds they are invested in to provide significant value creation (if they don't simultaneously destroy wealth.)
ps
Wasn't Celeste where a certain HC poster used to work?
At this stage I think the US$42M XRPU's are contingently compensation to the Northern Lights vendors- not 100% sure yet.
The point of growth in the valuation estimation is that despite it being difficult you can't avoid making it to get a robust estimation of value.
I like this sort of reverse engineering thinking however 3% growth at profitability levels above the cost of capital gives a very different valuation to growth profitability at or below cost of funds. (well at least It should)
Bugger. I just spent an hour typing up a post. Got distracted by something and had to walk away. Come back and hit preview to proof read and lost it. Thought I'd hit copy/paste, but obviously hadn't.
Crux of the post was that PAC's balance sheet is OK, but they are constrained with what they can and cannot do by the Aurora Trust. There's a knock-on effect. It also stops them from doing the sensible thing and buying back shares if management truly think they are super cheap.
Aurora's balance sheet itself, for a Fund manager, looks really stretched. Current liability deficit of $16m above cash. How do they Fund this? Needs a bit of faith in 2017FY cash flow. If not, borrow again and hope it comes good?
Also the reason why they needed to defer the $42m XRPU redemption it appears. I assume that this goes to the unit holders (ie. 65% to PAC). But where is it in PAC's accounts? Is it buried in the JV line item, I can't see it there. Are they not allowed to include it under the accounting standards because it's too contingent at this stage?
Otherwise, agree it's a tangled mess of entities and opaque reporting. Yes, that can provide opportunity, but it also adds extra layers of risk, because it's very hard to get the necessary information to dig down into the Aurora Trust numbers. Management don't seem to care on this score. Red flag.
History of value destruction through corporate activity. Also very hard to work out the money trail as part of the merger in 2014 that created the trust. Second hand info (can't confirm because earnings call not released) but seems like they are still looking to buy more stuff.
Watch out for share holder dilution in terms of employee share schemes within the entities fully or partially owned by the Aurora Trust. See Celeste as an example. Ripped up about 10% of the equity in one hit to incentivise employees.
Can't see a competitive advantage, in fact, where they are based in the US it's possible they are seen as "old world" and the new kids on the block (ie. Robo advice, ETFs) are disrupting the industry because their fee models are cheaper and more transparent. Not sure of the end game there, but definitely need to keep an eye on it.
Other thing to ponder, are the investment impairments / write-downs, really one-off expenses for entities that are serial acquirers of assets? Hmmm.
The people on this thread seem to be really smart and have the ability to not just read through but *understand* an annual report.
I wish I could do that.
Can you guys point me in the direction of some resources (books, websites, I guess?) that would help me be able to do that? How did you gain that sort of experience?
I can do stuff like generate a DuPont ROE, adjusted book value or other quantitative stuff like that with a spreadsheet, but these days computers are doing the same thing at lightning speed when annual reports come out so it doesn't feel so useful, plus I always get the feeling like there is some edge case or pitfall for those measures that means you have to treat each company uniquely. For example, ReXXar you calculated EV/EBITDA in the first post, but the equation for that needs the market value of debt how did you calculate that for MND which doesn't have any listed debt?
So I mostly buy index funds and LICs with low fees like ARG/AFI/MLT because I don't have those skills but I would love to know be confident enough to buy single name equities myself.
Regarding where I got the "debt" from enterprise value for MND, not exactly sure what you mean there's no debt, if you go to page 34 under Current Liabilities and Non-Current Liabilities just add up the "Interest bearing loans and borrowings" (7868 + 9678). I also add off-balance sheet liabilities but I haven't seen anyone else do that so maybe that's a topic for another day.
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